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THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS ON 
HARMONIZED OR HYBRID SYSTEMS OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Moderator: Leila Nadya Sadat 
Participants: William Schabas, Stefan Trechsel,  
   Christine Van Den Wyngaert 
Discussant: David Sloss 
LEILA NADYA SADAT (Moderator): It’s my great privilege and pleasure 
to introduce today’s session, entitled The Influence of International Law 
and International Tribunals on Harmonized or Hybrid Systems of 
Criminal Procedure. It’s also my great honor to welcome as old friends 
and new the panelists and many distinguished guests who have traveled 
long distances to be with us today in celebration of the centennial of the 
Universal Congress of Lawyers and Jurists. Over the last day we’ve heard 
some remarkable historic information about St. Louis and the St. Louis 
World’s Fair of 1904 and the Congresses held at the same time. But one 
Congress that was not mentioned was the Meeting of the 
Interparliamentary Union in St. Louis in 1904, which adopted a resolution 
calling for the settlement of differences between nations in the same 
manner as controversies between individuals, that is, through courts of 
justice and in conformity with well recognized principles of law. This 
resolution was transmitted to President Roosevelt, who then prevailed 
upon the Czar to call the Second Hague Peace conference of 1907. This, of 
course, was an enormous step forward in the construction of a world based 
on the international rule of law. But I don’t think the Congressmen—there 
weren’t any Congresswomen at the time—gathered there could have 
contemplated the current state of international law and adjudication. 
Through two long and bloody wars and conflicts ongoing still today, 
humanity at the same time achieved some incremental progress during the 
twentieth century toward the establishment of international institutions. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice, its successor the 
International Court of Justice, and the many other tribunals and dispute 
settlement bodies that currently exist, were all developed in the last 
century. 
The subject of today’s panel is the establishment of international 
criminal jurisdictions able to investigate and prosecute individuals accused 
of international and national crimes, as well as the harmonization and 
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incorporation of international norms and their influence upon each other. 
This morning, you will hear from three distinguished academics who have 
also, during their illustrious careers, worn the hat or are currently wearing 
the hat, of practitioners. Judge Messitte spoke too quickly, I think, when 
he bemoaned the lack of practitioners present at our celebration, because 
we have two commissioners and a judge on this panel alone. 
We will start off today with Professor William Schabas, who is the 
director of the Irish Centre of Human Rights at the National University of 
Ireland at Galway. He also served as a member of the Sierra Leone Truth 
Commission. He is a prolific scholar and author. In particular, he is the 
author of a leading monograph on the crime of genocide in international 
law, which was just recently translated into German. Professor Schabas 
will lead off with some reflections on practice before the ICTY, with 
particular emphasis, I believe, on the Miloševic trial and the recent ruling 
regarding the right to self representation issued by the Appeals Chamber in 
that case. 
Judge and Professor Christine Van den Wyngaert will then offer her 
views on practice before the tribunal from her perspective as an ad litem 
judge on the ICTY. She will then discuss some of the issues regarding 
harmonization of criminal procedure in Europe, particularly the Corpus 
Juris Project to establish a European prosecutor’s office for certain 
offenses. Judge Van den Wyngaert is at the University of Antwerp and is 
also a prolific scholar and practitioner of international criminal law. 
Among other things, she is the author of the “Blue Book,” as her students 
call it, an extraordinary compilation of international criminal law 
instruments, now in its third edition. She also served as an ad hoc judge at 
the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case, Congo vs. 
Belgium, decided in 2002. 
Our final speaker, Stefan Trechsel, modestly refers to himself as a 
Swiss lawyer, but he is also an extraordinarily distinguished scholar and 
teacher. He served as a member of the European Commission on Human 
Rights for twenty years, and he presided over the Commission from 1995 
until its abolition in 1999. He is currently teaching at St. Louis University 
and is in the process of writing a monograph on human rights and criminal 
procedure in a comparative perspective, to be published next spring by 
Oxford University Press. He will close today’s session with some remarks 
on the influence of human rights conventions, and particularly the 
European Convention on Criminal Procedure reform in Europe. In terms 
of the modalities, each of the speakers will have a very generous twenty to 
twenty-five minutes. We will then allow them to have some short 
responses to each other, if they arise, and then David Sloss, my colleague 
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and friend from St. Louis University, will give a brief commentary on the 
three papers and will open it up to the floor. And we will try not to keep 
you too long from your lunch. Please join me in welcoming today’s 
panelists. Thank you.  
PROFESSOR WILLIAM SCHABAS: Thank you, Leila. Leila Sadat has 
been a regular visitor to Galway, where I direct the Irish Centre for Human 
Rights. It’s so nice to be here in St. Louis with her for the first time. And 
it’s nice also to see her students out, joining us on a Saturday morning. I 
hope you didn’t indulge in the old trick of telling them it’s on the exam. 
SADAT: I would never stoop to that. 
SCHABAS: The subject I’m going to talk about this morning is 
international criminal procedure before the ad hoc tribunals and in the 
International Criminal Court, and this is a much younger subject than what 
we’ve been talking about over the last day or so. We’re not talking about 
something that begins in 1904, but rather something that begins around 
1994 with the creation, the previous year, of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
I have watched and studied over the past ten years this evolving 
process of building a new procedural system that draws from many 
different sources. It is a laboratory in comparative criminal procedure law. 
It began with a really phenomenal ignorance by the people involved, about 
what might be called “the other system.” The judges and lawyers in the 
Prosecutor’s Office started meeting early in 1994. They were of course 
experts in the system they had been educated in, but as a general rule the 
common lawyers had virtually no background, training, or familiarity with 
so-called civil law systems of criminal procedure, and the same was true 
for the civilian lawyers with respect to the common law. It didn’t take very 
long for them to start to understand things about the other system, and to 
develop almost an admiration for some of its accomplishments and 
features, rather than the hostility which marked the attitudes at the 
beginning. Today there’s really a very positive and constructive 
engagement between lawyers in both systems vis-á-vis the other. They 
demonstrate a willingness to learn, and a conviction that the best result 
will be in some way a hybrid of the two systems. 
The feeling that people came from either civil law or common law has 
diminished. I think this has, by and large, been a very positive 
development. It’s been rather remarkable, as well, to watch it evolve and 
take place over the last decade. You can see this now in such documents as 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which is very much a 
product of this cross-fertilization between the two bodies of procedural 
law and practice. 
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I first became acquainted with this problem early in 1994. At the time I 
was a professor in Montreal, Canada, and we attempted to organize at my 
law faculty a conference on the new rules of procedure and evidence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The rules had 
been issued, I think, in February of 1994. The statute of the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal, which is a resolution of the Security Council, provided that the 
details on the procedure would be worked out by the judges. The judges 
were elected in late ’93. They had several meetings in late ’93 and early 
’94, and adopted this first draft of their rules of procedure and evidence. 
This draft has since been modified on many occasions as part of this 
process. We organized a conference in April of ’94—I think it was the first 
conference on the subject anywhere to my knowledge—to reflect on these 
rules of procedure and evidence. Our guest of honor was the Canadian 
judge on the Court, Jules Deschênes. He was on the Appeals Chambers 
and he was a friend of many of ours. We had known him as a very 
distinguished judge in Quebec, and so Jules Deschênes presided over the 
meeting. He also gave a very interesting talk about how the rules had been 
drafted, and he explained that lawyers came from different systems. He 
himself was not particularly knowledgeable about European continental 
procedure. He described—I remember this vividly—he said, “The 
American judge”—referring to Gaby McDonald. Some of you will know 
her, I think she was a federal judge in Texas. He said, “The American 
judge showed up with the Federal Rules under her arms, and she never 
went anywhere in the Tribunal premises without the Federal Rules of the 
U.S. Court system under her arm.” She essentially tried to bulldoze 
through a model which was like what she was—Texas justice—is that the 
right term? There was some resistance from other judges, and there were 
debates about this. They ultimately developed a product. This first draft of 
the rules, which did actually represent an initial hybrid, although it was 
largely common law, and largely American. The American influence was 
not just because of Judge McDonald, but also because the American Bar 
Association had a project to prepare a draft of the rules, and these were 
very influential, as well. 
One of our other guests was a very distinguished Belgian international 
lawyer, Éric David, one of the best Belgian lawyers. Professor David was 
quite agitated about the rules, and he was explaining to us that the 
Americans had dominated and they had bulldozed through the rules, and 
they hadn’t shown proper respect for the continental legal traditions. A 
few months later I was at a meeting in Paris where I heard the same sort of 
thing: Les Anglosaxons ont gagné—the English have won—in the 
procedural battle. 
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In fact, there was already a certain amount of deference for continental 
procedures. One of the areas where the first debates took place was on the 
question of in absentia trials. The continental lawyers all said “You have 
to have in absentia trials because you’ll never get any accused, you’ll 
never be able to arrest Milošević or Karadžić or Mladić or Tudjman—
you’ll never get any of them.” And so you’ll have to hold in absentia 
trials, otherwise the tribunal won’t work. In 1994, they compromised. In 
order to accommodate this criticism, they created the Rule 61 procedure 
that provided for a kind of in absentia trial. In 1995 and 1996, the 
tribunals actually held several hearings—about half a dozen hearings—
under this in absentia proceeding. Some would last several days, they 
would hear a lot of evidence from the prosecution and then the judges 
would reach a conclusion that there was enough evidence to find the 
accused guilty. They would profess in each one of these rulings that “this 
is not an in absentia trial.” Really, it was a case of “methinks the lady doth 
protest too much.” They really were in absentia trials, the only meaningful 
distinction being that they didn’t impose a sentence when it was over. 
The debate continued about in absentia trials even into the preparations 
for the Rome Statute in 1998. They are excluded from the Rome Statute 
altogether, and the Rule 61 procedure isn’t even really repeated in the 
Rome Statute. I heard often during that debate that this was a question of 
trying to find an accommodation, but it was difficult because common law 
trained lawyers were in principle opposed. Common law lawyers believed 
that it was a question of fundamental rights, and were opposed to in 
absentia trials. I never fully bought into that, nor did I understand it. Even 
in common law jurisdictions we do accept trials continuing, sometimes, in 
the absence of a defendant. It’s not a question of absolute principle. It’s 
really more a view of the common law that if you’re going to have a 
lengthy trial you might as well make sure the guy’s there so you can throw 
him in jail when the trial’s over. Why spend days and days or weeks 
holding a trial of someone that you can’t actually punish? I think that was 
perhaps the reasonable view that prevailed. 
In the first trials of the ICTY, the Yugoslavia tribunal, we started to see 
issues debated that brought to a head some of the other tensions between 
common law and civil law. One of them is guilty pleas. I won’t go into 
detail, but the first conviction before the Yugoslavia tribunal was a guilty 
plea. Someone showed up and said, “I plead guilty. I was at Srebrenica. I 
killed a lot of people. I feel terrible. I’m guilty.” A big debate: Can you 
plead guilty? What happens with a guilty plea? The continental lawyers 
were intensely suspicious of the whole idea of guilty pleas, and said “this 
is the slippery slope toward plea bargaining, and we can’t allow it.” In the 
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end they developed a procedure for a guilty plea that was then echoed 
largely in article 65 of the Rome Statute. This is the Erdemović Decision. 
It was ruled upon on appeal in 1997, only months before the Rome Statute 
was finalized. I can remember the debate about that provision, article 65, 
and the buildup to the Rome Conference. It was at New York City in 
August of 1997 and there was a big confrontation between the French 
delegation and some common law delegations, mainly the Canadians. The 
Canadians had a draft proposal on plea bargaining, or on guilty pleas, 
called The Guilty Plea Procedure. But what’s underneath it all is the 
concept of plea bargaining. The French were very hostile to the whole 
thing. So they quarreled and squabbled, and they negotiated terms. Finally 
the Canadians—I’m not just saying this because I am a Canadian, but—
very skillfully finessed the whole thing. The French lawyer came back and 
said, “You will have to put in that provision a rule saying that the Court is 
not bound by discussions between the prosecution and the defense”—
which, of course, certainly in the Canadian understanding of plea 
bargaining, is entirely in accordance with the truth. We always understand 
that the negotiations between the prosecution and the defense don’t bind 
the judge. The Canadian lawyer turned to the French lawyer and said, 
“Okay.” The French lawyer said, “We won.” So, there’s this provision, 
article 65 of the Rome Statute, that deals with the possibility of plea 
bargaining and guilty pleas. There’s actually a long and interesting history 
now, at the Yugoslavia tribunal, of guilty pleas, and there were attempts a 
few years ago to promote guilty pleas. For a period of several months, the 
prosecution was very effective in eliminating a number of cases in the 
enormous caseload they have through guilty pleas, only to have the judges 
then dig in their heels at one point and double a sentence that had been 
negotiated between prosecutor and defense. The defense lawyers kind of 
lost their taste for guilty pleas after that, because they felt that the judges 
weren’t cooperating. At least they didn’t cooperate in this case, and so it 
did complicate things. This has no doubt contributed to lengthening, 
perhaps by several years, certainly by several judge years, how long the 
proceedings are going to last in the Yugoslavia tribunal. 
Erdemović had another issue demonstrating the conflict or the tension 
between the two systems, which is interesting. It dealt with the defense of 
duress, but since we’re focusing on procedure today I won’t go into detail 
about that. What the judges have often tried to do in addressing questions 
where the statute and the rules are silent is they have said, and the 
judgments differ on this, “We’re looking at comparative criminal law as a 
basis for general principles of law.” 
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General principles of law is one of the sources of public international 
law in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Other 
times judges say, “We’re looking at customary international law.” There’s 
actually not much customary international law in the area of criminal 
procedure. It’s more a question of trying to find some sort of common 
denominator. Sometimes that works. It does work in a lot of criminal law, 
particularly in substantive criminal law. Sometimes it doesn’t work. 
Sometimes it’s complicated by the fact that on issues like the defense of 
duress, it’s hard to find even a consistent pattern among common law 
jurisdictions. In the Erdemović case, Judge McDonald, the American 
judge, led the way in saying, “There cannot be a defense of duress for 
crimes of the gravity of crimes against humanity.” There were two 
dissenting judges. Antonio Cassese drew on the model from the Code 
Pénal, the French Napoleonic Code, which just talks about justifications 
and excuses and doesn’t attempt to govern specifically the issue of duress. 
Sir Nanian Steven, an Australian judge from the common law tradition, 
was the other dissenter. I think they show the difficulty of even trying to 
simplify these issues into a question of compatibility or a divergence 
between two systems. 
The other case, this time from the Rwanda tribunal, that, I think, 
illustrates some of the development and the evolution in this area is the 
Akayesu case. Akayesu was the first major trial of the Rwanda tribunal 
and, in that case, there was a strange incident in the court. The trial was 
being held before three judges. The presiding judge, the late Laïty Kama, 
was a Senegalese magistrate from the continental French legal tradition. 
He would question the witnesses a great deal, something that was part of 
his training and his tradition. He found this very normal. He started 
questioning a witness, and it became clear over the course of his questions 
that he knew things about the evidence that he had no business knowing, 
that he shouldn’t have known. It soon became clear that what had 
happened is the following: they had a procedure for disclosure, by the 
prosecution to the defense. There’s some reciprocal disclosure as well 
now, the defense to the prosecution. At this point in the evolution of the 
procedural regime, it was essentially disclosure by the prosecution to the 
defense, but it had been formalized. In the jurisdiction I come from, in 
Québec, disclosure is a very informal procedure that takes place between 
counsel—I don’t know what the rule is here in this jurisdiction. We would 
meet the prosecutor in his or her office, and it would all be done rather 
informally. They have formalized it in the Rwanda tribunal, and so the 
prosecution prepared all of the evidence and gave it to the registrar, who 
then gave it to the defense. It became apparent that the registrar had made 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p651 Session five book pages.doc 10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
658 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:651 
 
 
 
 
a photocopy of all the material and slipped it under the door of Judge 
Kama, at his request. Judge Kama had, therefore, studied all the evidence. 
There was a very embarrassing day in court when this all came out. Judge 
Kama resolved it with his colleagues by ordering that the prosecution file 
was to be produced in the record of the court. It became essentially like an 
inquisitorial trial where you have the evidence prepared by the prosecutor. 
The difference being—and I think that this raises questions about 
fairness—that the prosecutor had never prepared a file in the way an 
instructing magistrate would do. The file was not intended to reflect 
evidence both á charge and à décharge, as they say in the French system, 
that is, the evidence both for and against conviction. It was really a file of 
evidence in favor of conviction. This, in a sense, distorted the trial and this 
attempt to merge one system with the other may have led to some 
unfairness. 
Let me turn to the Milošević trial, which is now the hot issue, and a 
few of the difficulties that have arisen. I will also bring out some of the 
tensions in these procedural issues. In February 2004, the trial was two 
years old and had been going since February of 2002. Richard May, an 
English judge who was the presiding judge, announced that he was ill and 
would be resigning. Judge May, as it turned out, had terminal cancer and 
he passed away some months later. Judge May’s resignation provoked an 
issue about his possible replacement. 
The tribunal invoked Rule 15 bis, an amended rule, in order to justify 
replacing him with a judge, despite the absence of agreement by Milošević 
himself. Rule 15 bis is an interesting rule because it’s a new rule. It had 
been adopted only a year earlier by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia in the midst of the Milošević trial. The rule change 
was actually signed by Judge May who was the President of the Rules 
Committee at the time. I presume that’s just an irony, I don’t think Judge 
May knew a year earlier he was going to be so ill. The original rule 
adopted by the judges, back in the time of Judge Deschênes in 1994, 
authorized the replacement of a judge, but only with the consent of the 
accused. If we go back to Nuremberg, where they had the four judges, four 
alternates were designated. They were there in case one of the judges got 
sick or died, or resigned or was recused. They’d thought of it. I think they 
thought of it in 1994, but they didn’t want to pay for it. I think that’s really 
the issue, that it was going to be too expensive for them to provide for 
alternate judges.  
But obviously, in 1994, the judges made a conscious decision that they 
could replace a judge only with the consent of the accused. I think that’s 
significant because it means they all turned their minds to the issue, which 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/14
p651 Session five book pages.doc 10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HARMONIZED PROCEDURE 659 
 
 
 
 
is a fundamental issue of fairness, and said, “Yes, we could do it. Yes, we 
could go on, but only if the accused agreed.” Then three years later, they 
changed the rule to say they could go on, even if the accused didn’t agree. 
They say if the two remaining judges unanimously—it’s kind of an odd 
wording, two judges unanimously—agree to continue, then they could 
continue, over the objection of the accused—or, rather, despite the lack of 
consent by the accused—if it was in the interest of justice. 
There was actually a ruling on this at the Rwanda tribunal in late 2003 
in a case where the judges said—and here’s how they interpreted the 
interest of justice—“this is going to delay the trial, there are a lot of 
accused waiting to go on, so it wouldn’t be in the interest of justice to start 
a new trial.” This interpretation basically means the defendant’s interests 
have nothing to do with the interests of justice. Yet, in 1994, the 
defendant’s agreement, consent, was central to the whole thing. I can’t 
give you any particular insights into all this with respect to the Milošević 
trial, because it wasn’t litigated. Milošević didn’t consent, but he didn’t 
challenge it either. We don’t know about the deliberations on the 
amendments to the rules either because they are secret. So, how much of 
all this was a question of the different cultures of judges from different 
systems? I’m not able to tell you. 
I can tell you that it has become a very important issue with respect to 
the recent decision to impose counsel on Milošević, and that’s my final 
point, and I want to tell you a little about this one. Milošević, from the 
very beginning of the trial in 2002, invoked his right set out in article 21 of 
the statute, which is basically copied word for word from article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is the gold 
standard on procedural due process in international law. Article 21 says 
everyone has the right to defend themselves, in person or by counsel of 
their own choosing. It couldn’t be clearer, and it’s not accompanied by any 
qualifier along the lines of “subject to limits in a free and democratic 
society,” which we see often in international human rights instruments. It 
just says everyone has a right to defend themselves, in person, or by 
counsel of their own choosing. Milošević invoked the right, and Judge 
May, who was presiding said, “That’s your right. That’s fine, you can do 
this.” He said, “You have a right to defend yourself, and to not be 
defended by counsel. That’s your right.” The prosecutor contested it from 
the very beginning. 
When the trial was about a year old, the prosecutor in a motion said 
“impose a lawyer on Milošević.” There was a ruling with Judge May 
presiding. It was a bench ruling in December of 2002. Written reasons 
were issued in 2003, saying essentially what I’ve just told you. It was his 
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absolute right to defend himself, and that they did not have good grounds 
for imposing counsel. He said he relied on the—I’ve written it down here 
because I can’t remember Faretta v. California.1 The Supreme Court of 
the United States decision on the same point. He insisted on the fact that 
you couldn’t impose counsel in an adversarial trial. The prosecutor said, 
“We have evidence, but drawn from civil law jurisdictions, from European 
jurisdictions, of them imposing counsel.” Apparently it’s rather common 
and widespread to impose counsel. The European Court of Human Rights, 
in a decision from 1992, even ruled that it was an appropriate 
interpretation of article six of the European Convention, which says the 
same thing as the statute of the Yugoslavia tribunal. Judge May and his 
two colleagues said that it was different when it was an adversarial trial. 
He said, “An adversarial trial is not built on the search for truth, for 
absolute truth, in the same way as an inquisitorial trial. An adversarial trial 
is built on decisions by the accused. That includes the right to refuse 
counsel, to defend themselves, and to control how the trial takes place.” 
There was a ruling by the Human Rights Committee, which was the 
treaty body that rules on the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
dealing with Spain. The Human Rights Committee said you can’t deny 
someone the right to defend himself without violating the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. They were interpreting the identical provision 
as the judges were applying. So Judge May dismissed the prosecution’s 
motion and said the trial will continue. He left a little phrase in there 
saying, “Keep it under review,” and I’m sure that Judge May, wherever he 
is, I’m sure he’s in Heaven, is looking down on this trial saying, “Never 
put ‘and keep it under review’ in your judgment.” They’ve used that little 
phrase, which is totally out of context by my reading of May’s judgment, 
to say, “Well, it’s a year later, let’s review.” He had hardly left the court 
when the judges decided they were going to reopen the question. The 
prosecutor seized on it and they’ve essentially, in a ruling from September 
2004, reversed Judge May’s decision. They say it’s because time has 
moved on and they said they would keep it under review. 
In the judgment, they dismiss the significance of the ruling by the 
Human Rights Committee. They emphasize the fact that it’s common in 
civil law jurisdictions to impose counsel, and just say, “Enough, already. 
We’re going to move on, and we’re going to impose counsel.” They made 
this ruling in September 2004 and it was then appealed to the Appeals 
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber issued a ruling in November 2004 that 
 1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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largely upholds, certainly on the legal issues, the later decision of the trial 
chamber. It overturns Richard May’s ruling. My choice amongst them all 
is the May decision; I think that May’s decision is the best one. 
I note, by the way, that in all of this mess we’ve had about counsel over 
the last year since May left that it’s actually had the effect of slowing 
down the trial, rather than speeding it up. If they’d said last March, “Well, 
let’s just get on with it. Milošević, it’s your turn, go ahead,” we’d probably 
be much further advanced in the trial than we are today. The reason they 
used for changing—reversing, really—the judgment of Judge May, they 
said, “Actually there are limits to the right to defend oneself.” They said 
there’s always the limit to defend oneself when someone is excluded, such 
as when an obstructer or a misbehaved defendant is excluded from the 
courtroom. Defendants may forfeit their right to defend themselves, and 
then you can impose counsel. That’s in the U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
and that’s not challenged. But no one has alleged Milošević is doing this. 
There’s a lot of innuendo, and you pick this up, but it’s not in the rulings, 
and until it’s in the rulings I think we have to say that it’s not a proper 
legal consideration. The judges also cite the fact that in many common law 
jurisdictions now it’s recognized that when there are sexual crimes, 
particularly those involving minors, that an accused can’t cross examine 
the victim. In Scotland, the accused can’t even act as his or her own 
counsel in a sexual crime involving children. Well, okay, that’s an 
interesting case, and I understand why it exists. It’s an exception that takes 
account of the protection of the victims. That’s a legitimate concern. But 
that’s not the issue in the Milošević trial. What they hinge it all on in the 
Milošević trial is the fact that he has high blood pressure and that this is 
delaying the trial, as it no doubt is because he’s missed many trial days 
because of his illness. They’re moving along, but more slowly than they 
would like to. I don’t think that’s a very good reason to impose counsel. I 
mean, if an older defendant can be denied the right to defend himself 
because of high blood pressure, well could they for other medical reasons, 
like diabetes? I assume there are probably people in this room who, under 
the Yugoslavia tribunal, can’t defend yourself. If you’re taking blood 
pressure medication, you know, forget it. Even if your blood pressure is 
under control, there’s probably nothing like a genocide indictment to, you 
know, raise the blood pressure. I think it’s normal that the guy would be 
under some strain. But in any event, he’s going to have to instruct counsel. 
He’s going to need to be there to instruct counsel. I just see this as a 
problem. There’s a strong argument to be made that it’s a discrimination 
based on disability, ultimately. What would we do with a stutterer who 
said, “Judge, this t-t-t-trial is going to take a lot l-l-longer than you think”? 
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Would that be a reason to say, “Ok, you’ve forfeited your right to 
counsel”? Could we do it with a blind person? I don’t think so, I think 
there it would be clear that it’s discrimination. But I think here it’s also a 
case of discrimination. 
A final point, Leila said two minutes. I won’t take that much, but the 
last element is that after the appeals ruling of the first of November, the 
defense lawyers who were imposed upon him have raised up their backs 
and said, “But wait a minute. We don’t have his confidence. We’re not 
being instructed by him, it’s an ethical issue. We can’t act as counsel.” 
They were in court [in November]. I was also in the Hague and I saw them 
and chatted with them about the case. They were arguing that they want to 
be off the case. They said, “We can’t act for him, it’s an ethical issue.” So 
this is the latest in the saga. It’s one thing to try to impose counsel on an 
unwilling defendant, but if you have counsel who are behaving ethically, 
they may have a problem themselves. The counsel, who are British 
barristers, Stephen Kaye and his assistant Jill Higgins, are arguing that it 
really is an ethical issue for a lawyer in the common law system. Clearly, 
all of these kinks between the two systems have still not been worked out. 
Thank you.  
SADAT: Stefan 
STEFAN TRECHSEL: I face the same problem my colleagues had, 
namely that of fitting the subject into the time frame. There are two 
extremes. One would be to say, is there an influence of the European 
Convention on criminal procedure in Europe? The answer is yes. The 
other extreme would be to go into details, and that could become 
something like the 800 page book by Robert Esser, a young German 
scholar. You realize that the time allotted here is closer to the yes or no 
answer than to 800 pages. And, actually, the answer is not a clear “yes,” 
but a “yes and no.”  
I will start with a “yes,” and the “no” explanation will come only 
towards the end. I also adapted the title slightly, in that I speak of the 
influence on criminal procedure in Europe, not necessarily on the reform 
of criminal procedure. I’m not quite sure where the difference actually 
lies. In a certain way, I think the fact that the protection of fundamental 
rights has improved is itself a reformatory influence, but it is not normally 
and generally looked at in this way. 
I would like to begin by addressing a technical aspect. How does the 
Convention influence national procedure law? What are the avenues of 
reception? Then I will give a number of examples which have changed 
criminal procedures in European states. Due to the Convention and its 
practical application, I will choose a few examples that concern groups of 
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states rather than a single one in order to get an overview of the European 
picture. Finally, I will come to a brief conclusion. 
What are the avenues of reception? How does the Convention law 
influence the national law of criminal procedure? I would distinguish three 
roads: a preventive road, so to speak, a reactive road, and then the 
academic digestion of what happens.  
Preventive reform of codes of criminal procedure with a view towards 
ratification of the Convention happens relatively frequently. I followed 
this in Switzerland, which ratified the Convention in late 1974. Matthias 
Krafft, a scholar who later became chief advisor on international public 
law for the Swiss government, made a very comprehensive study of Swiss 
law, including problems with the criminal procedural law. His study was 
published prior to the ratification and led to preventive reforms of codes of 
criminal procedure. There was a general awareness that we were in danger 
of colliding with Convention law, and a number of amendments were 
adopted. Similar reactions occurred in other countries, but not all. France, 
for instance: I am not aware that they prepared for the ratification. In the 
newly accepted member states, the former Communist countries—and it’s 
almost half of all the countries that are now members of the Council of 
Europe, twenty-two out of forty-six—strong preparatory work was 
fostered. They had to adapt their codes of criminal procedure in order to 
avoid conflict with the Convention. 
The second road is the reactive one. After a violation of a specific 
guarantee of the Convention is caused by the application of the domestic 
law of criminal procedure, that domestic law will be amended. It is useful 
to recall that the European system has both fully judicial proceedings to 
examine whether there has been a violation of fundamental rights and a 
rather effective mechanism of implementation. The Committee of 
Ministers, the “executive of the Council of Europe, as it were—is charged 
with the implementation of the Court’s judgments. Whenever a violation is 
found, the Committee of Ministers will ask the state concerned what it has 
done to conform with the judgment. A sum of money will usually be paid 
to the successful applicant as “just satisfaction.” This can be a difficult 
matter if the sum is important and the problem is burning, such as in the 
Loizidu case. This case was brought by a Greek Cypriot woman who 
owned real estate in the North and did not have access to it. She was 
granted more than a million dollars in damages and costs. This would not 
have created an enormous problem had it just been an isolated, single case. 
But there are over a thousand other similar applications waiting in the 
background and the potential cost to Turkey has been estimated to amount 
to some 30 billion USD.  
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Sometimes a law must be adapted, and then the proceedings before the 
Committee of Ministers cannot be expected to lead to a result within a 
short period of time. 
Belgium, for example, had been found in violation of the right to 
respect for family life because, according to its legislation the status of 
children born out of wedlock was such that a mother had to adopt her own 
child in order to give her or him an adequate position. It took ten years and 
further applications to the European Commission of Human Rights for the 
law finally to be changed.  
In some areas, unfortunately, the effects of the Strasbourg proceedings 
have hardly been noticeable so far. Criminal proceedings in Italy have a 
tendency to last too long. Civil proceedings are even worse. There is now 
a mechanism that is supposed to deal with this on a domestic level, but it 
seems not to be effectively implemented. It is difficult to react to a finding 
of a violation of Article 6, the right to fair trial, due to excessive length of 
the proceedings, because what is needed is an improvement in efficiency. 
This is something that the Committee of Ministers cannot put forward in 
specific proposals. 
The third point is the academic adoption of Convention law. I have to 
admit that in Europe, we have a tendency of excessive specialization of 
law professors. We become professors via habilitation, agrégation, which 
includes rather formal proceedings Once this level is achieved, the 
professor bears a specific label and will limit her or his activities to the 
field covered by that label. She or he will normally be a person competent 
in the area of civil law, public law, or criminal law once and forever. The 
combination of human rights and criminal procedure is placed between 
two chairs. Human rights is normally regarded as the domain of 
international public law specialists who are not always very conversant 
with criminal law and criminal procedure. They have normally no 
practical experience in that area at all. Those who have knowledge in 
criminal proceedings, on the other hand, generally concentrate on the 
problems concerning domestic law, which is generally limited to only one 
jurisdiction. This is where they make their reputation. Scholars in 
domestic law issues are whom the national court will quote in their 
judgments and what their colleagues will read and comment. It is awkward 
to go and look across the border to Strasbourg case law—for many, there 
is even a language barrier. That is why the reception by academia of the 
Strasbourg case law under the heading of criminal procedure has been 
slow. There have been a few very early pioneers, Mario Chiavario, and 
Antonio Cassese for instance, in Italy; Evert Alkema and Egbert Meyer, in 
the Netherlands; Jaqcues Verlu, and Christine here in Belgium; the late 
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Theo Vogler in Germany, Dominique Poncet in Switzerland, and I 
apologize to quite a number of others which I have not mentioned 
although they would have merited it. In Germany, one explanations for the 
reluctance to accept the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
as a serious source of the law of criminal procedure may be the fact that, 
on the one hand, the Constitutional Court enjoyed a very high reputation 
as protector of fundamental rights, and, on the other hand, that that same 
Court refused to regard the Convention as a source of constitutional law 
which it was competent to apply. The marriage between the two fields 
took a quite a long time to come about. Now, however, I seem to observe a 
real boom. Today, most textbooks of criminal procedure cannot be taken 
seriously if they do not refer to the Convention. I think all European 
criminal law and criminal procedure specialists, beginning with my 
neighbors, will agree that the Strasbourg case law has become an 
important integral part of the domestic case law of criminal procedure. 
Now, in which areas do we find an influence of the Convention on 
domestic law? As I’ve said, I can only give a slightly arbitrary selection. 
The first point I want to make is perhaps surprising. The Strasbourg case 
law has widened the scope of criminal law. How can that be? If you look 
at the case-law, particularly at the judgments handed down in the 90’s, you 
will find that many of the cases where the Court found a violation of 
Convention rights in criminal proceedings were cases on the “borders” of 
criminal law. In particular, they were on the limit between criminal law 
and disciplinary law, or criminal law and the law of petty offenses which, 
in domestic law, were regarded as having a merely administrative 
character. Some states, Germany for instance, have taken petty offenses 
out of the criminal law and re-labeled them Ordnungswidrigkeiten 
(“regulatory offences”) which was considered as decriminalizing them. 
The Court has quite correctly said, “We have to create an autonomous 
notion. We must define ourselves in Strasbourg, what is a crime, and what 
is not a crime, otherwise the Convention will not apply equally in all the 
States which have ratified it”. 
The leading case on this creation of “autonomous notions” is Engel and 
others (Dutch soldiers) versus the Netherlands. The soldiers complained of 
disciplinary proceedings. In its judgment of 26 June 1976, the Court began 
to draw a dividing a line between what was to be considered “criminal” 
and other forms of reaction which did not lead to the application of the 
specific guarantees of Article 6. This basic jurisprudence has been 
developed constantly over the following years. It lead to labeling tax 
offenses as criminal law, although in some countries, such as France, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, they had been regarded as something other than 
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offenses. This meant that in those countries there was no normal court 
procedure for cases of tax withholding. This led to very important changes 
of the respective domestic law.  
I already referred to the example from Germany, where as a measure of 
decriminalization petty offenses were relabeled “Ordnungswidrigkeiten” 
instead of Straftaten; and elaborate set of ideological arguments was 
construed around this issue. However, from the beginning the procedural 
guarantees were to be exactly the same as in normal criminal proceedings. 
I’ve often had discussions with my German colleagues who thought that in 
Strasbourg we were destroying this fabulous, modern movement of 
decriminalization. I do not think that anything of that kind happened.  
To sum up: Many violations of the Convention were found in cases 
where criminal procedure guarantees of the domestic law did not apply at 
all. The state concerned felt quite “innocent” because, according to the 
local belief, one was not dealing with a “criminal charge” in the first place.  
The Strasbourg case law also influenced the organization of the 
judiciary. The court defined in an autonomous way what is a “tribunal,” 
and in a few cases it came to the result that, what was regarded as an 
impartial tribunal on the domestic level could not so be regarded under the 
Convention law. One of the most important examples is the state security 
courts in Turkey, where the court was composed, inter alia, of military 
personnel. On the other hand, certain bodies were accepted as “courts” 
although they were not called courts in the domestic legal order or were 
set up to adjudicate only certain specific issues. 
The role of the top echelon prosecutors led to problems in a number of 
countries, starting with Austria, but then also in Belgium, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands. In these countries, the supreme prosecutor, Avocat Général, 
Procureur Général, Procureur Général, had a very special relationship 
with the highest court which expressed itself in one of two ways. First, the 
Procureur Général had the right to file observations with the Supreme 
Court which were then not served on the accused, and on which the 
defense could not comment. Another example for a lack of information 
was that the reporting judge would prepare a draft judgment for the court 
to deliberate upon and would send a copy of that draft, called Croquis in 
Austria, to the public prosecutor’s office, but not to the defense. Strangest 
of all, in Belgium, the public prosecutor assisted in the deliberations of the 
court. The Belgian lawyers believed that the public prosecutor held the 
role of guardian of the law and had to make sure that the laws were 
interpreted in a uniform way and that the law was correctly applied. I 
cannot understand how Supreme Court justices could live with such a 
system. For an outsider it cannot be understood. In a first round, Delcourt, 
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the Strasbourg Court said there was no violation of the convention. In the 
later case of Borgers, the Court changed its view and recognized that such 
a system was not compatible with the right to a fair trial including the 
respect for equality of arms. The French are very angry about this 
judgment. I recently met Mr. Francie Casserla, Procureur Général, who at 
present works with the Ministry of Justice and who complained bitterly of 
the lack of understanding of the Strasbourg Court for these particularities 
of the legal tradition and swore that the Avocats Généraux were absolutely 
neutral and only acted in the interest of the law. The Commission’s 
argument before the court was that the only opposing entity at the trial is 
the Procureur Générale, so he must be regarded as the opponent from the 
point of view of the accused. In fact, the Court also referred to the 
importance of appearances in its conclusion. 
The position of the public prosecutor at the lowest level has changed 
due to the case law on the rights of an arrestee. Everyone arrested has the 
right under the American Convention, the ICCPR, and the European 
Convention, to be brought promptly before a “judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power.” Now, in many countries, 
including France, a number of Swiss Cantons, Italy, and Spain, the 
arrestee was brought before the Procureur, the public prosecutor, who was 
regarded as a “magistrat,” to determine whether s/he should be detained or 
not. 
The role of the prokurator was particularly deeply rooted, as Stephen 
Thaman said yesterday, in the former Communist countries. The 
Procuratura was a very powerful institution, entrusted, if I can use the 
word, with seeing to the correct application of the law. That is to say, in an 
application of the law in conformity with party goals. Their power 
extended to practically all areas of public activities, it had more or less 
unlimited competencies. Control over measures of coercion was in the 
hands of this authority, and the offer considerable resistance to being 
deprived of that power. There are still fights on the issue going on, e.g., in 
Tajikistan. Twice I attended a meeting—the second meeting with the same 
people—where we heard exactly the same arguments. I did not understand 
why I had to travel to attend that. I was told, “Well, you know, with us it’s 
difficult.” This is hard to grasp. In other countries, including Russia, it has 
worked. In Bulgaria I was grossly insulted by the public prosecutors for 
presenting and justifying the Convention Law on this issue. However, one 
can say that the general tendency, that the Convention puts the judge as 
guardian of the defendant’s position, and the prosecutor in the 
background, comes to be accepted. There are still residues of the old 
ideology that the prosecutor who is charged with prosecuting, and perhaps, 
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also with investigating, is at the same time regarded as part of the judiciary 
in the sense that it is his or her task also to investigate in favor of the 
defense. With the result that one hears the argument: “Maybe this 
magistrate is a prosecutor, but he also has the duty to investigate in favor 
of the defendant, and therefore, one can entrust him with such tasks as 
controlling the application of coercive measures. Having been a public 
prosecutor myself, I can tell from my own experience that one is not 
immune against déformation professionnelle. If you prosecute all the time, 
you develop an attitude that goes under your skin and influences your 
outlook on cases and, perhaps, on the world in general. 
I have a little to say about the law of evidence. Here the influence is 
relatively small, because the Court shies back from saying that someone 
was wrongfully convicted. To say that a trial was unfair because the 
evidence was not assessed correctly is regarded, in the Court’s 
terminology, as acting as a “fourth instance.” It is like holy water for the 
Devil. This is something the judges shy away from with sometimes 
unsatisfactory or even shocking results. 
An example is Schenk v. Switzerland, where a tape that was clearly 
obtained unlawfully was used in evidence. The court nevertheless held that 
there was plenty of other evidence to convict and, not very convincingly, 
found no violation. On the basis of an expert opinion prepared by the 
Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law and 
Criminology, the directors of which are amongst us today, the Court 
assumed that such evidence was generally admissible in the Convention 
countries. I believe, however, that the opinion of the Institute was 
somewhat misunderstood, but that’s question which does not fall to be 
discussed here today. 
A rather shocking case is Khan v. United Kingdom, where a defendant 
was really tricked into making self-incriminatory statements in a prison, 
by an agent who was wired. The agent more or less questioned him in 
front of concealed cameras. It was the classical example of a set-up. To 
me, this belongs in the category of “state gangsterism.” The court found 
no violation, which I can only regret. 
Why did I say that perhaps the answer to the question of whether the 
European Convention has had an influence on criminal procedural law in 
Europe should be “no”? Because it is not the aim of the system to reform 
legislation. The Strasbourg court does not tire in stressing that it only 
decides a specific case. It does not want to comment on whether the 
legislation at issue is in conformity with the Convention. Exceptionally, 
such a finding could be the result in an inter-state case. Statistically, these 
cases are without importance. As a rule, the Court deals with individual 
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applications and limits itself to the examination of the single specific case, 
as through a microscope and with those Scheuklappen (blinders), that you 
put on horses when drawing carriages, so that they don’t look left or right. 
The Convention does not want to reform criminal procedure, and it is 
certainly aloof of disputes on the different systems. The court, I think, 
even went too far in this direction when in Huvig and Kruslin, both against 
France, it said that case-law even in civil-law countries falls to be 
regarded as a “law” sufficient to interfere with “lawful” personal rights.  
In the fifty years of its operation, the Convention has made an 
enormous leap forward. It was for a long time regarded as a resort for 
vexatious litigants. Now it is part of everyday court practice in Europe. It 
may not have the same weight in all forty-six states, but its importance 
increasingly everywhere. I believe that this is a great achievement. Thank 
you. 
 
LEILA SADAT: Thank you. Alright, Christine, now it’s your turn. 
CHRISTINE VAN DEN WYNGAERT: Thank you, Leila. I’m addressing 
this meeting on hybrid or harmonized systems of criminal procedure as a 
hybrid person myself, because I’m somewhere in between an academic 
and a practitioner. I used to be a law professor, now I’m serving as a judge 
on the Yugoslavia tribunal. So I must step down from my normal identity 
as an academic, my usual openness in speaking and making critical 
comments. I can’t go into the discussion on the Milošević trial, for 
example, because now, with my new hat on my head, I’m obliged to be 
discreet about ongoing cases.  
This being said, I’m going to convey a number of thoughts and feelings 
to you about what it is like being a judge in a tribunal that is, as has been 
repeatedly said, a laboratory where we try to find a common ground 
between the two great legal systems. I am sitting on a bench with a 
Swedish judge and a presiding judge from Australia, who has a 
longstanding practice in a common law criminal justice system. I myself, 
as a Belgian, am someone who has been trained in the continental system, 
so it’s really interesting to see tension—the differences in the way in 
which the trial is conducted. Many questions would probably be handled 
in a different manner in a civil law setting. So it’s really a continuous 
attempt to try and find a common ground in a legal environment that, I 
think, is more of an adversarial nature. The ICTY procedural setup is often 
said to be somewhere halfway between the two systems, but I think if one 
looks at the most important features of the tribunal then the more 
important orientation is a common law orientation. But this may be my 
own bias as a continental lawyer. 
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Let me start with the ICTY’s conception of human rights standards. I 
think the examples Professor Schabas gave are very pertinent. The in 
absentia judgments are a prominent civil law feature. They are allowed by 
Rule 61, which was introduced in the early years of the Tribunal, but 
abandoned now in practice, mainly because of the controversy over their 
human rights compatibility. The reading of the relevant article in the 
human rights instruments is different in the two systems. Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights entitles you to be tried in your 
presence. That doesn’t mean that, if you decide not to be present, the trial 
cannot be conducted in your absence. That’s the way in which many civil 
law countries look at things. The common law interpretation of the same 
article is different: common lawyers tend to think that in absentia trials are 
per se incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention, and the 
corresponding clause in Article 14 of the Covenant. 
The same analysis applies to the question of imposing counsel. Bill has 
described the way we could look at it differently in a continental legal 
system. In Article 6 of the European Convention, there is a right to defend 
oneself in person or through counsel. There is case law from the European 
Court of Human Rights to the effect that this “or” term is interpreted as 
being the right of the State to decide whether the defendant is defending 
himself in person or by counsel, not the right of the individual. So there 
are different readings that can be given to the basic standards of human 
rights incorporated in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals.  
The first draft of ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence were, so 
I’m told, written at the United States Department of Justice. So, obviously, 
the rules are more common law oriented. Bill Shabas’ picture of judge 
McDonald carrying the U.S. Federal Rules under her arm is very striking 
on this point. Another feature that has encouraged the preponderance of 
the adversarial system is that in the early years of the functioning of the 
court, many of the assistant legal officers were offered with the generous 
help of United States and the United Kingdom. So you can see what that 
means in terms of how the case law is developed, with a great contribution 
by people who were trained in a common law legal system.  
Last but not least, it’s very important to remember that the first 
prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, and his staff, were mainly common law 
oriented and, quite logically, the system has been set up in the common 
law mode. The statute itself doesn’t lean in one or another direction when 
it comes to filling in the role of the prosecutor. Hence, the prosecutorial 
function could have also been developed operated in a continental mode, 
which would have meant a prosecutor looking at both sides of the case, 
not only at the case against the accused. This would have been the one 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/14
p651 Session five book pages.doc 10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HARMONIZED PROCEDURE 671 
 
 
 
 
case approach that is typical for the continental legal system, the one 
which focuses on the search for “the truth” has not happened. What we 
have now instead is a two-case approach, with a parties-driven system. 
This also means that the defense has to play a much more active role than 
in a civil law system, with the necessary financial implications. 
As a result, the overall structure is very adversarial common law. 
Nevertheless, a number of features that were introduced in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence are straightforward continental. For example, the 
limited allowance of written evidence; unsworn statements by the accused; 
the proprio motu possibility of judges to call in evidence, which is highly 
theoretical, I must say, because it’s on the book, in the rules of proceeding, 
but it’s hardly used in practice. Other examples are: the practice of 
combining verdict and sentence in one single judgment and  the practice of 
some trial chambers to give the accused “the last word.”  
A prominent common law feature that hasn’t really made it in the 
ICTY is the guilty plea. As a civil lawyer I am totally unfamiliar with it 
myself. I remember, a long time ago, my own astonishment as an 
academic when I learned that in the UK, guilty pleas are entered in more 
than ninety percent of the cases. Without them, the system would collapse 
under an impossible caseload. This is one of the problems today in Italy, 
as we learned from professor Illuminati in his talk at this conference. 
Guilty pleas are also part of the procedural architecture of the ICTY. I can 
see the advantages of the system. Yet, as a judge, I remain disturbed by the 
idea of not getting the full picture of a case, of feeling that part of the truth 
is not being put before you. The guilty plea has been introduced and the 
judges, as you rightly observed Bill, feel divided about it. The division is 
shown in the sentencing because you have judges that reflect the guilty 
plea in the sentence, and you have others that don’t. So there, too, it shows 
the tension between the two systems and it may explain why it is not often 
used in practice. 
Another important point is the role of victims. Victims, like in the 
common law system, are degraded, from my perspective as a civil lawyer, 
from victims to witnesses in their own case. They are subjected to cross 
examination, and thus lack the protection they would get in the continental 
procedure against questions of that kind. So here, too, there is a strong 
preponderance of the common law system. 
The Tribunal has a number of particular problems that need to be 
resolved in the short term. As you know, we have to finish the workload 
within four or five years. It’s going to be a very difficult task for us to 
handle all these cases that are before us already. The completion strategy 
is an important challenge for the tribunal. The question obviously is how 
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do you manage a strict completion date in view of the fact that the 
proceedings are very lengthy and that you need to maintain the fairness of 
the proceedings? You can’t speed them up in a way that would be 
detrimental to fairness. One of the strategies that we use is that of 
transferring cases to the region under the new Rule 11bis of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. Cases have already been transferred to Bosnia 
and Croatia. Another mechanism is the joinder of cases, for example in the 
Srebrenica case, in which the trials of several accused have been joined 
into one big mega-case. Guilty pleas could speed up the proceedings, but 
for the reasons explained above, they have been less frequent than in most 
domestic common law jurisdictions. 
I was going to deal with two subjects, so maybe it’s time to turn to the 
other one, on which I will be very brief. I thought it would be interesting 
to give you an idea of another line of thought which has developed in 
Europe in the area of harmonization, hybridization of criminal justice 
systems. This is the Corpus Juris Project. What is the Corpus Juris 
Project? It was a project launched by the European Commission. The 
Director of the budget of the Commission got irritated by the fact that they 
could see many subsidies were paid to people who weren’t entitled to 
them and there were no actions by states to try to recover these subsidies. 
Why? Because it was not the money of the states that was at stake, it was 
European money. So the European Commission convened a number of 
academics from different member states of the European Union and 
invited them to come up with a solution to the problem of punishing 
financial crimes in the European Union. What were the problems? The 
problems are that in a trans-European fraud case, if you want to prosecute 
and punish offenders, you need cooperation between states. We have 
twenty-five different criminal justice systems. The traditional mechanisms 
of cooperation include extradition, judicial assistance, etc. But there are 
obstacles to cooperation, for example in the field of fiscal and economic 
crimes. One of these obstacles is the ordre public clause that allows states 
to refuse cooperation if it’s against their ordre public, or in a larger sense, 
economic order. Empirical studies have shown that for financial crimes 
there were enormous problems and there was really a need to change the 
legal thinking. That was how this group of legal experts came into 
existence. The mandate of this group was to think up something that may 
not be politically feasible immediately, but that could be juridically sound 
and that might, at some stage in time, be put into practice. The group was 
chaired by Mireille Delmas-Marty, one of the great French criminal 
lawyers and included prominent scholars such as Professor Spencer from 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/14
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Cambridge, Professor Tiedemann from Germany, Professor Grasso from 
Italy and professor Bacigalupo from Spain. 
The idea that we came up with is something special. We proposed to 
harmonize the prosecutorial system, but not the court system. For specific 
crimes, not all crimes, but only these fraud crimes affecting the European 
Union, we would institute a European Public Prosecutor. This Prosecutor 
would be based in Brussels and each member state would have a Deputy 
Public Prosecutor. These “Eurocrimes,” as we would call them, would be 
prosecuted by this prosecutor, but before the national courts of the 
member states. This would leave the criminal justice systems of the states 
as they are, but “Europeanize” the prosecution. 
I’m just going to be very brief, because it would take me too long to 
explain the whole concept, but that’s not the purpose of this talk anyway. 
The purpose is to give you an idea of a different formula. Here, we were 
harmonizing the crimes. In Corpus Juris, we defined a number of financial 
crimes that would be the subject matter of the jurisdiction, this European 
Public Prosecutor. National courts would still apply their own procedural 
rules, but for these particular crimes they would apply the Corpus Juris 
notion and the notions of general criminal law that are attached to it as 
worked out in the Corpus Juris. While we were doing this reflection, 
which was a great brainstorming exercise in comparative criminal law and 
procedure with these scholars from different nations, we didn’t really think 
that our proposals would be readily accepted. We thought this was an 
academic exercise, offering a solution that might have perhaps 
materialized in the very long run. However, the European Parliament took 
it up, and in various academic circles we were met with more approval 
than we initially anticipated. The result is that this idea was written into 
the European Constitution as a potential development. Meanwhile, the 
Constitution has been tabled. Yet, this formula for financial crimes could 
be the first step in dealing with other crimes, such as terrorism. This is a 
debate in its own right and I won’t take any more of your time. I thank you 
for the opportunity to explain this to you. Thank you very much.  
SADAT: Thank you, Christine. Thank you, and thank you to all the 
panelists for respecting the time limits so beautifully. Does anybody want 
to comment on any of the papers already? Bill or Christine? Or should we 
just pass over to David? Do you want to give a brief wrap-up and then 
we’ll turn to the audience for questions? 
DAVID SLOSS: When Leila asked me to be a discussant on this, I said, 
“That’s fine, what do you see as my role?” She said, “Well, you can say 
whatever you want, but you just have to keep it very brief.” So, I was 
pleased to do that, because, frankly, I was more interested in hearing what 
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p651 Session five book pages.doc 10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
674 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:651 
 
 
 
 
the other panelists had to say than in speaking to you myself. I haven’t 
been disappointed and I think we’ve heard some very interesting 
commentary here. I want to join in thanking the panelists for that. I can’t 
really, in the brief time allotted, do justice to summarizing anything they 
have said so I thought about what could I do briefly. I could talk about the 
impact of international law on criminal procedure in the United States. 
That’s easy to do briefly, there basically isn’t any impact of international 
law on criminal procedure in the United States. At least, that’s what I was 
going to say a week ago. I just want to comment very briefly on one case, 
decided on Monday, which shows that things may be changing here. 
As you all know, the current administration has set up these military 
tribunals to try folks in Guantanamo Bay. They’ve been challenged on 
various grounds. The main argument presented by the petitioner 
challenging the military tribunals was really based on constitutional law. 
But interestingly enough, a federal judge in D.C. just ruled on Monday 
that these tribunals are invalid and relied primarily on international law 
rather than constitutional law in reaching this decision. The judge 
essentially said that the criminal procedure protections recognized by 
international law—and here we’re focusing primarily on the Geneva 
Conventions—were not respected by the process set up by the U.S. 
government in establishing these tribunals. It remains to be seen what will 
happen with this case, but it is at least a brief glimmer that there may in 
the future be some impact of international law on criminal procedure here 
in the United States. 
SADAT: Thank you. 
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